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ABSTRACT.Online social networks (OSNs) have become an important source of information for a
tremendous range of applications and researches. However, the high usability and accessibility
of OSNs have exposed many information quality (IQ) problems which consequently decrease
the performance of OSNs dependent applications. Social spammers are a particular kind of ill-
intentioned users who degrade the quality of OSNs information through misusing all possible
services provided by OSNs. Given the fact that Twitter is not immune towards the social spam
problem, different researchers have designed various detection methods of a spam content. Ho-
wever, the tweet-based detection methods are not effective for detecting a spam content because
of the dynamicity and the fast evolution of spam. Moreover, the robust account-based features
are costly for extraction because of the need for huge volume of data from Twitter’s servers,
while most other account-based features don’t model the behavior of social spammers. Hence,
in this paper, we introduce a design of new 10 robust behavioral account-based features for filte-
ring out spam accounts existing in large-scale Twitter "crawled" data collections. Our features
focus on modeling the behavior of social spammers, such as the time correlation among tweets.
The experimental results show that our new behavioral features are able to correctly classify
the majority of social spammers (spam accounts), outperforming 75 account-based features de-
signed in the literature.
RÉSUMÉ. Les réseaux sociaux en ligne (OSN) sont devenus une source importante d’information
pour une vaste gamme d’applications et de recherches. Cependant, la grande facilité d’utilisa-
tion et l’accessibilité des OSN ont exposé de nombreux problèmes associés à la qualité de l’in-
formation qui, par conséquent, diminuent les performances des applications dépendantes des
OSN. Étant donné que Twitter n’est pas à l’abri du problème de spam social, les chercheurs ont
conçu diverses méthodes de détection de spam. Cependant, les méthodes de détection basées
sur le tweet ne sont pas efficaces pour détecter le contenu spam en raison de la dynamique et
1. This work is an extended version of a published work Washha et al. (2016a) in "32e Conférence sur la 
Gestion de Données - Principes, Technologies et Applications" (BDA 2016).
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l’évolution rapide du contenu spam. En outre, les méthodes basées sur les comptes sont coû-
teuses pour l’extraction en raison de la nécessité d’un énorme volume de données provenant
des serveurs de Twitter, tandis que la plupart des autres fonctionnalités basées sur le compte
ne modélisent pas le comportement des spammeurs sociaux. Par conséquent, dans cet article,
nous présentons une conception de nouvelles fonctionnalités robustes basées sur le compte
pour filtrer les comptes spam existant dans de grandes collections "aspirées".Nos fonctionna-
lités se concentrent sur la modélisation du comportement des spammeurs sociaux, comme la
corrélation du temps entre les tweets. Les résultats expérimentaux montrent que nos nouvelles
fonctionnalités comportementales sont capables de classer correctement la majorité des spam-
meurs sociaux (comptes spam), surperformant 75 fonctionnalités de l’état de l’art.
KEYWORDS: Twitter, social network, spam.
MOTS-CLÉS : Twitter, réseau social, spam.
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1. Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have an enormous popularity over the Internet
because of the wide range of services they provide for their users. The most popular
OSNs such as Twitter, and Facebook have exceeded billions of registered users and
millions of daily active users (Chen et al., 2016). OSNs mainly rely on their users
as primary contributors in generating and posting information. Users’ contributions
might be exploited in different positive ways such as understanding users’ needs, and
analyzing users’ opinions for election purposes (Sedhai, Sun, 2016). However, the
usability of OSNs and the absence of effective restrictions on posting have exposed
different information quality problems such as social spam, and information overload.
These characteristics have subjected OSNs to different attacks by ill-intentioned users,
so-called social spammers, to post spam content (Agarwal, Yiliyasi, 2010). Social
spammers intensively post non-sensical content in different contexts (e.g., topics) and
in an automated way. For example, posting a tweet talking about "how to earn 100$
in 5 minutes" under the "#BBC" topic is a spam tweet because such a tweet has no
relation to the given topic at all. Generally, social spammers have a wide range of
goals to publish a spam content in OSNs, summarized in (Washha et al., 2016b, Yardi
et al., 2009): (i) spreading advertisements to generate sales; (ii) disseminating porn
materials; (iii) publishing viruses and malware; (iv) and creating phishing websites.
Motivation and Problem. As OSNs have many information quality problems, in
this work, we handle a particular issue related to the social spam problem in Twitter
platform. More precisely, we address the problem of filtering out spam accounts exis-
ting in large-scale "crawled" collections. The solution, that will be introduced in this
paper, has been integrated with our team researches on social networks. Our team has
researches addressing many issues related to OSNs such as tweet summarization (Ab-
delhamid et al., 2016), event detection (Hoang, Mothe, 2016), social profiling (Sirinya
et al., 2014), profiles enrichment (Mezghani et al., 2014), socio-semantic communi-
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ties detection (Rocío et al., 2015), and social interests (Manel et al., 2014) detection,
where Twitter platform has been adopted as information source. Thus, experimenting
and working on high quality of Twitter information is an indispensable step to obtain
and maintain high performance results in our team researches.
At the technical level, a considerable set of methods has been proposed to re-
duce and eliminate the social spam problem. Most of the existing works are dedicated
for detecting individual Twitter spam accounts (Ahmed, Abulaish, 2013, Meda et al.,
2014, Yang et al., 2012, Perdana et al., 2015, Amleshwaram et al., 2013, Guo, Chen,
2014, Singh et al., 2014, Cao, Caverlee, 2015, Yardi et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2011,
Fabricio et al., 2010, Hai, 2010b, Almaatouq et al., 2016, Washha et al., 2016b, Hu
et al., 2013, Chen et al., 2016) or spam campaigns (Zhang et al., 2012, Zi et al.,
2012). These methods mainly exploit the supervised machine learning approach com-
bined with the features extraction concept to produce binary classifiers using anno-
tated data-sets. The features introduced in the literature for spam accounts detection
are categorized into three types: (i) user-based features such as number of followers;
(ii) content-based features like number of URLs; (iii) and graph-based features such
as local-clustering. Most of the features introduced in the first two types are suitable
for processing large-scale collections of Twitter accounts because those features don’t
require too many information from Twitter’s servers like the graph-based features.
The methods of spam campaign detection are not appropriate for handling large-scale
collections since the features of this level require huge volume of information from
Twitter’s servers, making the treatment of large-scale collection almost impossible.
One might suggest the use of cloud systems to process big volumes of Twitter data
in parallelized and fast way. However, this solution is not applicable since the main
source of limits is from Twitter’s servers in which the number of API calls is constrai-
ned to a defined number of calls. Thus, to have a near-unlimited of API calls, we must
obtain a big number of hundred API tokens to getting access in Twitter data. Unfor-
tunately, obtaining big number of API tokens is not possible since it requires "phone
verified" Twitter accounts.
The other less used approach (Chao et al., 2015, Chen et al., 2015, Martinez-
Romo, Araujo, 2013, Fabricio et al., 2010) detects spam tweets instead of spam ac-
counts. However, this tweet level approach is not effective since the content of any
tweet is up to 140 characters. Hence, the features that can be extracted from a tweet
are not useful to detect spam tweets effectively. Moreover, the existing attempts ba-
sed on spam account detection have critical limitations and major drawbacks. One of
these limitations is the ease of manipulation in the existing features by social spam-
mers. As a motivating example, the number of followers (i.e., the accounts that follow
a user) is one of many features used mainly in detecting social spammers; however,
this feature can be easily manipulated by social spammers through creating a huge
number of accounts and letting each account to follow each other. Another feature is
counting the words in a user’s tweets, where such a feature is used in discriminating
among spam accounts and non-spam accounts. Unfortunately, most of the user and
content features introduced in the literature are similar in performance to the given
two examples. Thus, this raises the need to search for new robust features that can
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detect spam accounts (or spam users) effectively and efficiently, with minimizing the
need for Twitter’s information as much as possible.
Contributions. In this paper, we introduce a design of a new set of features sui-
table for processing large-scale collections of Twitter users. Our features focus on mo-
deling social spammers’ behaviors by deeply analyzing their posting behavior such as
writing style similarity among user’s tweets. In designing our features, we assume
that social spammers have different behavior from normal (legitimate) users in post-
ing tweets. In other words, social spammers have systematic posting patterns, while
normal users have a kind of randomness in posting content on Twitter. We validate the
robustness of our features through a series of experiments conducted on a large-scale
data-set consisting of more than 400,000 annotated Twitter accounts, using different
supervised machine learning algorithms. The experimental results demonstrate that
our new features are able to correctly classify the majority of social spammers (spam
accounts) with more than 70% of accuracy, precision, recall, and f-measure, when
using Random Forest learning algorithm, outperforming 75 account-based features
designed in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Twitter’s rules
followed in fighting social spammers, and the works that have addressed the social
spam in Twitter. Section 3 shows the formalization and the definition of the problem
we investigate, in addition to the design of our features. Section 4 describes the data-
set used in performing a series of experiments. Section 5 evaluates our features by
using machine learning algorithms, including a deep comparison with a wide set of
state-of-art features. Section 6 concludes the paper with giving some insights about
future directions in Twitter spam detection.
2. Background and Related Work
Social Spam Definition. Social spam is defined as a nonsensical or a gibberish
text content appearing on OSNs and any website dealing with user-generated content
such as chats and comments (Agarwal, Yiliyasi, 2010). Social spam may take tremen-
dous range of forms, including profanity, insults, hate speeches, fraudulent reviews,
personally identifiable information, fake friends, bulk messages, phishing and mali-
cious links, and porn materials (Chen et al., 2016). One might view the social spam as
an non-relevant information; however, this interpretation is quite not accurate. We jus-
tify this misinterpretation through the definition of information retrieval (IR) systems
(Manning et al., 2008). The relevancy of documents in IR systems is dependent on an
input search query. Thus, the irrelevant documents with respect to an input query are
"not" necessary to be a spam content. Hence, as an additional definition, social spam
might be defined as irrelevant information that doesn’t have an interpretation in any
context as long as the input query is not a spam.
Social Spam and Information Quality. Social spam has a strong relation to the
the information quality (IQ) field. As shown in Figure 1 (Agarwal, Yiliyasi, 2010),
four categories and different dimensions are adopted for evaluating applications and
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that some reported accounts might be for legitimate users, not for social spammers. In
addition to this manual reporting mechanism, Twitter has defined some general rules
(e.g., not allowed to post porn materials) for public in order to reduce the social spam
problem as much as possible with permanently suspending the accounts that violate
those rules (Twitter, 2016). However, social spammers can simply bypass Twitter’s
rules. For instance, social spammers may coordinate multiple accounts with distribu-
ting their desired workload among accounts to mislead the detection process. These
accounts tend to exhibit an invisible spam behavior. Thus, these shortcomings have
motivated researchers to introduce more robust methods for the applications that use
Twitter as information source. We categorize the Twitter social spam detection ap-
proaches into two different types based on the automation detection level: (i) machine
learning level as a fully automated approach; (ii) and social honeypot as a manual
approach requiring human interactions.
Machine Learning Approach. In this approach, researchers have built their me-
thods through employing three levels of detection, distributed between tweet-level
detection, account-level detection, and campaign-level detection.
Tweet-Level.Martinez-Romo and Araujo (Martinez-Romo, Araujo, 2013) have de-
signed a language model based method to detect spam tweets existing in trending
topics. The method computes the kullback-leibler divergence between the language
model of each tweet and the language model of the topic itself. However, this method
is not suitable for real-time filtering because of the need for the tweets that have been
posted in the same topic from Twitter’s servers. The works introduced in (Fabricio et
al., 2010, Chao et al., 2015, Chen et al., 2015) have proposed a set of light statistical
features such as number of words with a set of time-independent machine learning
algorithms such as support vector machine (SVM), and Random Forest, to build a bi-
nary classifier. Although of suitability of these works for real-time filtering; they have
a major drawback in efficiently detecting spam tweets (i.e., low spam recalling) due
to the evolving of spam content over time.
Account-Level. The works introduced in (Fabricio et al., 2010, Washha et al.,
2016b, Wu et al., 2017, Hai, 2010b, McCord, Chuah, 2011, Stringhini et al., 2010,
Meda et al., 2016, Bara et al., 2015) have focused on extracting feature from users’
accounts, including the number of friends, number of followers, similarity between
tweets, and ratio of URLs in tweets. In more dedicated studies, the works proposed
in (Cao, Caverlee, 2015, Wang, Pu, 2015) have identified the spam URLs through
analyzing the shorten URLs behavior like the number of clicks and the length of re-
direction chain. However, the ease of manipulation in this type of features by social
spammers has given a motivation to extract more complex features by using the graph
theory. For instance, the studies presented in (Yang et al., 2011, 2012, Almaatouq et
al., 2016) have examined the relation among users using some graph metrics to mea-
sure three features, including node betweenness, local clustering, and bi-directional
relation ratio. Leveraging such complex features gives high spam accounts detection
rate; however, they are not suitable for treating large-scale collections because of the
huge volume of data that must be retrieved from Twitter’s servers.
Account-based features for detecting social spammers 71
Campaign-Level. Chu et al. (Zi et al., 2012) have treated the spam problem from 
the collective perspective view. They have clustered a set of desired accounts accor-
ding to the URLs available in the posted tweets, and then a defined s et o f features
is extracted from the accounts clustered to be incorporated in identifying spam cam-
paign using machine learning algorithms. Chu et al. (Chu et al., 2012) have proposed 
a classification model to capture the difference among bot, human, and cyborg with
considering the content of tweets, and the tweeting behavior. Indeed, the methods
belonging to this detection level have a major drawback. The features used in these
methods require a great number of REST API calls to obtain information like users’
tweets and followers. Consequently, exploiting the current version of campaign-level
methods is not appropriate for filtering large-scale collections of Twitter accounts due
to the high volume of data required from Twitter’s servers.
Beyond the features design level, the works introduced in (Hu et al., 2014, 2013) 
have proposed two optimization frameworks which use the content of tweets and ba-
sic network information to detect spam accounts using an efficient online learning
approach. However, the major limitation in these works is the need for information
about the network from Twitter, making these methods inapplicable to large-scale data
collections
Honeypot Approach. Social honeypot is viewed as an information system re-
source that can monitor social spammers’ behavior through logging their information
such as the information of accounts and any available content (Lee et al., 2010). In 
fact, there is no significant difference between Twitter’s anti-spam mechanism and the
social honeypot approach. Both of them need an administrative control to produce a
decision about the accounts that have fallen into the honeypot trap. The necessity of
administrative control is to reduce the false positive rate, as an alternative solution to
blindly classifying all users dropped in the trap as spam users.
3. Account-Based Features Design
In this section, we introduce notations, definitions, and formalization of our target
problem. Then, we present the design of our features by which we distinguish among
spam accounts and non-spam accounts.
3.1. Notations and Problem Formalization
Let UCollection = {u1, u2, ...} be a finite set of Twitter users representing a target
data collection which requires processing to filter out the spam accounts (users) that
belong to social spammers. In order to minimize the size of information needed from
Twitter’s servers, for each user u• ∈ UCollection, we collect the top 100 tweets using
a single REST API call. This number of tweets is the maximum number that Twitter
can provide in a one single call. It is possible to retrieve more user’s tweets, if any;
however, this increases the number of API calls, doubling the required time to process
the entire users in the given collection. This number of tweets (100 tweets) per user is
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relatively enough to take a precises decision about user type. Hence, we model each
user u• ∈ UCollection by a 2-tuple, u• = (Tweets,Age). Each element in the tuple
and some additional functions are defined as follows:
Tweets. We model the tweets of user u• ∈ UCollection as a finite set, Tweets =
{t1, t2, ...}, where t• represents a tweet object consisting of simple meta-data. We mo-
del these meta-data by a 5-tuple t• = (T ime,Hashtags, URLs,Mentions,Words),
where T ime is the posting date of the tweet, t•, represented in seconds time unit com-
puted since 1970/1/1, Hashtags is a finite set containing all hashtags posted in the
tweet, URLs also represents a finite set of all URLs posted in the tweet, Mentions
is a set of users who are mentioned in the tweet extracted through searching for words
starting by@ symbol, andWords is a finite set consisting of words posted in the tweet
such thatWords ∩Hashtags ∩Mentions ∩ URLs = ∅.
Age. The creation date of each account is registered on Twitter’s servers, when
users setup their accounts. We compute the age of a user’s account in days time unit
through calculating the difference between the current time date (T imenow) and the
creation date of the account (T imecreation), defined formally as Age = T imenow −
T imecreation.
Kullback–Leibler Divergence (KLD) (M1,M2, V ).Given two different language
models, M1,M2 and a set of terms V (e.g., words of a tweet), we compute the simi-
larity of the two language models using a customized version of KLD (Kullback,
Leibler, 1951), defined as:
KLD(M1,M2, V ) =
log |V | −
∑
w∈V P (w|M1) ∗min(| log
P (w|M1)
P (w|M2)
|, log |V |)
log |V |
(1)
where P (w|M•) is the probability of the term w of being generated by the given
language model M•. We perform this customization since the range of the classical
KLD method is unbounded and thus the∞ value appears when two language models
are dissimilar. Hence, our customization reverses the semantic of KLD values (i.e., 0
⇒ dissimilar and 1⇒ similar), with bounding its value between 0 and 1.
Problem Formalization. With the presented notations and definitions, our main
problem is to detect and filter out Twitter social spammers existing in a given col-
lection. Formally, given a collection of Twitter accounts (or users), UCollection, the
problem is turned to build a binary classification model with minimizing the number
of requests to Twitter’s servers, y : u• → {Social Spammer, Legitimate User},
u• ∈ UCollection.
3.2. Features Design
In designing our features, we have deeply analyzed a large set of spam accounts
suspended by Twitter. Unlike the state-of-the-art features, our features focus on mode-
ling user’s behaviors since, according to the social spammers’ trends, legitimate users
have completely different behaviors like the randomness in their tweets content and
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APIs in automating the posting of spam content, a correlation might exist between the
posting time probability distribution of hashatgs, mentions, URLs, or textual words.
For example, Figure 3 shows two posting time probability distributions of tweets
containing two instances (#H1 and #H2) of the hashtag service. It is obvious that the
social spammer has focused on the #H2 when posting tweets and then after a while
has changed the attention towards #H1. Although the two probability distributions are
not identical in the posting time, they are correlated in the probability value and the
time period between each two consecutive tweets. The probability of having such a
correlation in a legitimate user’s tweets is quite low since legitimate users are random
in their posts and in using Twitter’s services.
We model this posting behavior through computing the cross-correlation between
different instances of a tweeting service: hashtags, URLs, and mentions services. In a
formal way, let Is be a set of all unique instances available in user’s, u ∈ UCollection,
tweets and posted with a tweeting service s ∈ {Mention,Hashtag, URL}. Also, let
Pi be the posting time probability distribution of the instance, i ∈ Is. Since the posting
time distributions time can be viewed as time shifted signals, we adopt the correlation
(Oppenheim, 1999) method to measure the posting behavior similarity among user’s













where Area(•) is a function that computes the area of the new distribution resulted
by applying correlation (i.e., 0 area means dissimilar distributions), P• ⋆P∗ is a cross-
correlation between two different distributions, and P• ⋆ P• is a correlation between
same distribution known as an auto-correlation. The intuition behind i2 is to get the
instance that has the maximum correlation with the instance i1.
The summation of the maximum areas is normalized by the area of the instance
that has the maximum self-similarity multiplied by the number of instances. Thus,
the IS value is between 0 and 1, where 0 means that there are no instances having
same posting behavior, while 1 means that all instances have similar posting behavior.
As social spammers might use all possible posting services, we extract three features
through applying equation 5 on hashtags, URLs, and mentions services. The defini-





t∈u.Tweets t.Mentions, and IURLs =
⋃
t∈u.Tweets t.URLs.
Posting Diversity. Legitimate users and social spammers may use hashtags, URLs,
and mentions tweeting services in an intensive way. In such a common scenario, the
classical statistical features existing in the literature such as number of URLs, number
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of hashtags, number of mentions, and percentage of URLs (Fabricio et al., 2010) don
not significantly contribute in distinguishing among users’ types. Our feature goes
beyond these statistical ones through computing the posting diversity for each service
separately such as the diversity of hashtags used in user’s tweets. As an intuition,
spammers intensively post their tweets with focusing on a single instance of a tweeting
service (e.g., hashtag), while legitimate users have a kind of diversity in posting their
tweets without focusing on a particular instance or even a tweeting service. By using
the same definitions used in posting behavior feature part, the diversity of an instance





The 0 value of PD means that the instances set is empty, while the 1 value means
that each instance in Is has been used only once in the user’s u tweets. We apply
this feature on four different tweeting services, including hashtags, mentions, URLs,
and textual words services. Hence, the definition of the four instance sets are defined
as Ihashtags =
⋃





t∈u.Tweets t.URLs, and IWords =
⋃
t∈u.Tweets t.Words.
Language Model-Based Tweets Similarity. Social spammers try to avoid de-
tection through non-duplicating exactly their tweets by generating random sentences
from a predefined dictionary of words. Thus, in this case, the exact similarity feature
can easily fail in capturing this spamming behavior.
We model this spamming behavior through computing first the uni-gram word
language model of user’s, u, tweets. Then, we measure the similarity between the
language model of each tweet and all user’s tweets language model, using the cus-
tomized version of Kullback-Leibler Divergence defined above. Formally, for a user
u ∈ UCollection, letMTweets be a uni-gram word language of the user’s u tweets, and
let MT be a uni-gram word language model of the tweet T ∈ u.Tweets, the tweets







The upper and lower bound of LMTS are between 1 and 0, respectively. The high
value gives an indication that the user’s u tweets are almost similar in the content and
thus the probability of being a spam account (social spammer) is high, while the low
value means that most user’s tweets talking about different topics.
4. Data-set Description and Ground-Truth
In the literature, there is no publicly available data-sets for research uses. Moreo-
ver, for privacy reasons, social networks researchers provide only the IDs of objects in
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Table 1. Detailed statistics of our data-set used in performing the experiments
Social Spammers Legitimate Users
Statistic Name Value Ratio (per 100 users) Value Ratio (per 100 users)
Number of users 11,451 (2.8%) — 409,170 (97.2%) —
Number of geo-enabled users 2,542 (1.7%) 22 (38.6%) 147,200 (98.3%) 35 (61.4%)
Number of verified users 48 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 15,585 (99.7%) 4 (100%)
Number of users’ followers 126,078,117 (0.11%) 1,101,022 (26.1%) 12,779,787,065 (99.8%) 3,123,344 (73.9%)
Number of users’ followees 54,493,725 (3.6%) 475,886 (54.4%) 1,636,779,971 (96.4%) 400,024 (45.6%)
Number of tweets posted 146,626,275 (2.9%) 1,280,466 (51.1%) 5,024,219,375 (97.1%) 1,227,905 (48.9%)
Number of tweets retrieved 874,557 (2.6%) 7,637 (49.5%) 32,007,284 (97.4%) 7,822 (50.5%)
Number of retweeted tweets 331,995 (2.8%) 2,899 (50.7%) 11,464,552 (97.2%) 2,810 (49.2%)
Number of replied tweets 104,848 (2.4%) 915 (45.9%) 4,425,005 (97.6%) 1,081 (54.1%)
Number of URLs 185,925 (1.9%) 1,623 (39.9%) 10,011,831 (98.1%) 2,446 (60.1%)
Number of Hashtags 468,593 (3.3%) 4,092 (55.1%) 13,677,994 (96.7%) 3,342 (44.9)
Crawling Method. We exploit our research team crawler to collect accounts and
tweets, launched since 1st June 2016. The streaming method is used to get an access
to 1% of global tweets, as an unbiased crawling way. For each tweet being streamed,
we extract the user ID of the tweet and then we retrieve the top 100 users’ tweets using
Twitter REST APIs. We store uesrs’ tweets in JSON format where the meta-data that
Twitter provides in any tweet is shown and annotated in Figure 4.
Data-set Description and Ground-Truth Building.We perform our experiments
on a data-set consisting of around 420,000 Twitter accounts, after merging our pre-
vious data-set used in (Washha et al., 2016b). These accounts are a result of 60 days
of crawling from 1/June/2016 to 31/July/2016. To evaluate the effectiveness of our
features and the state-of-the-art ones, we created an annotated data-set through labe-
ling each account (user) as a spam or non-spam. However, with the huge amount of
accounts, using manual annotation approach to have labeled data-sets is an impractical
solution. Hence, we leverage a widely followed annotation process in the social spam
detection researches, named as "Twitter Suspended Spammers (TSS)" (Hu et al., 2013,
2014), summarized in Figure 5. The process checks whether each user was suspended
by Twitter. In case of suspension, both the user and his tweets are labeled as a spam;
otherwise we assign non-spam to both of them. In total, as reported in Table 1, we
have about 11,500 spam accounts suspended by Twitter, forming around 3.0% of all
accounts in our data-set. It is important to mention that not all non-spam accounts are
truly non-spam, since Twitter might not have suspended some of them yet. However,
on the other side, all accounts suspended by Twitter in our data-set are truly belonging
to social spammers. Thus, the ratio of social spammers in our data-set is more than
the percentage reported in Table 1. Although our data-set is not balanced; the norma-
lized (per 100 users or accounts) statistics in Table 1 show the effectiveness of social
spammers in polluting Twitter content. For example, Twitter social spammer averagely
posts about 12K of tweets, which is almost equal to legitimate users’ tweets. Also, the
given statistic about the average number of hashtags posted by 100 users shows how
much the hashtag service is used by social spammers in spreading their spam content.
One important thing is the number of followers and followers. Indeed, according to
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Table 2. A set of state-of-the-art of user-based features adopted in the comparison
with our new account-level features
Index Feature Name Description
User Features
1 Number of tweets Number of tweets that have been posted by the user.
2 Verified user Boolean indicator showing whether the user is verified by
Twitter.
3 Account age Number of milliseconds spent since the creation date of
the user’s account.
4 Existence of Spam words in
the screen-name attribute
Boolean indicator checking whether the screen name at-
tribute contains a spam word.
5 Number of lists Number of groups that have listed the user.
6 Default account image Boolean indicator checking whether the image of the
user’s profile is the default one.
7 Geo-enabled Boolean indicator showing whether the geographical lo-
cation of the user’s account is activated or not.
8 Screen-Name length Length of the screen-name attribute of the user.
9 Profile description length Number of words of the profile description.
10 URL in profile description Boolean indicator stating whether the description of the
user’s profile has a URL.
11 Number of followers Number of accounts that follow the user.
12 Number of followees Number of accounts that the user follows.
13 Fraction of followers to followees Ratio of the user’s followers to the user’s followees.
14 Following to Followers Ratio Ratio of the user’s followees to the user’s followers.
15 Number of Friends Number of accounts that the user follows them and they
follow the user in the same
time (i.e., intersection of followers and followees).
16 Reputation Ratio of number of followers to the sum of both followers
and followees sets.
17 Number of spam words in
the account description
Number of the spam words that exist in the description of
the user’s account.
features because of the huge number of information needed from Twitter’s servers to
extract them, requiring months to collect these information.
Balanced Data-sets. It is obvious that our data-set is imbalanced in the class label
distribution where the ratio of social spammers class is less than 3%. In fact, conven-
tional supervised machine learning algorithms are often biased towards the majority
class (Wallace et al., 2011). The biasing problem happens because the loss functions
of these algorithms attempt to optimize quantities such as error rate without taking the
distribution of classes into consideration. In our problem, the worst case happens when
the minority class (social spammers) examples are treated as outliers with respect to
the majority class (legitimate users). Thus, these learning algorithms simply generate
trivial classifiers that classify every example as the majority class. The recommended
solution for such a problem is performing either oversampling or undersampling as
a preprocessing step (Wallace et al., 2011). However, applying oversampling method
is not suitable in our case since to make the data-set balanced, we have to increase
the number of social spammer examples to around 400,000 and thus the over-fitting
problem might easily occur. Hence, we adopt the undersampling approach to have a
balance data-set. In order to utilize all labeled examples, we have created 35 ≈ 409,17011,451
sub-datasets where each one has 22, 902 examples distributed equally between the so-
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Table 3. A set of state-of-the-art of content-based features adopted in the comparison
with our new account-level features
Index Feature Name Description
Content Features
1 Number of mentions Number of accounts that have been mentioned in the user’s tweets
2 Number of unique mentions Size of the unique set of accounts that have been mentioned in the user’s tweets.
3 Number of mentions per tweet Total number of mentions in the user’s tweets to the number of the tweets.
4 Number of numeric
characters per tweet
Ratio of the total number of numeric characters existing in the user’s tweets to the number of the
user’s tweets.
5 Number of replied to Number of tweets that Twitter users have replied to the user.
6 Number of user’s replies Number of tweets that contain a reply to other users.
7 Ratio of replied tweets Ratio of the number of replied tweets to the number of user’s tweets.
8 URL ratio Ratio of the tweets that contain URLs to the number of user’s tweets.
9 Tweets Similarity Textual similarity degree among the user’s tweets.
10 Time weighted Tweets similarity Similarity between the user’s tweets with weighting it using the difference time between tweets.
11 Number of words per tweet Ratio of the number of words existing in the user’s tweets to the number of user’s tweets.
12 Duplicated Tweets Ratio of tweets that have been duplicated by the user.
13 Number of Hashtags Number of hashtags that are available in the user’s tweets.
14 Max Hashtag frequency Maximum probability value of the probability distribution of the hashtags mentioned in the user’s
tweets
15 Mentions ratio Ratio of the number of mentions in the user’s tweets.
16 Unique mentions ratio Ratio of the number of unique mentions in the user’s tweets.
17 Unique URLs ratio Ratio of the number of unique URLs in the user’s tweets.
18 Interaction rate Ratio of the number of tweets that have been replied to the user’s followees and followers.
19 Cosine similarity Average content similarity over all user’s tweets using the standard cosine similarity over the bag-
of-words vector representation.
20 Hashtaged tweets ratio Ratio of the number of the user’s tweets that contain at least one hashtag to the total number of the
user’s tweets
21 Avg Hashtags per tweet Average number hashtags that exist in each user’s tweets.
22 Retweeted tweets ratio Ratio of the number of retweeted tweets to the total number of the user’s tweets.
23 Average tweet length Average number of characters of the user’s tweets.
24 Number of URLs Number of URLs existing in the user’s tweets.
25 Number of unique URLs Length of the unique set URLs posted in the user’s tweets.
26 URL repetition frequency Average repetition frequency of a URL posted in the user’s tweets.
27 Average number of spam words Average number of the spam words that exist in the user’s tweets.
28 Average number of hashtags
per word
Average number of hashtags per word in the user’s tweets.
29 Average number of
URLs per word
Average number of URLs per word in the user’s tweets.
30 Hijacking Topics Cosine similarity between the user’s tweets and the tweets of the topics that have been mentioned in
the user’s tweets.
31 Intersection with trending topics Ratio of the number of trending topics mentioned in the user’s tweets to the total number of all topics
in the user’s tweets.
32 Duplicated domain names ratio Ratio of the number of unique domains that exist in the user’s tweets to the number of tweets that
contain at least one URL.
33 IP-to-Domain ratio Ratio of the unique IP addresses resolved from the existing domains in the user’s tweets to the
number of unique domains.
34 URL and Tweet Similarity Cosine similarity between the content of a tweet containing URL and the landing page content of
that URL
35 One-gram characters Number of alphabetical characters in the user’s tweets.
36 Number of favorites Total number of tweets that the user has liked them.
37 Number of retweets Total number of retweets that the user’s tweets have gained.
38 Ratio of retweeted tweets Ratio of the number of retweeted tweets to the number of user’s tweets.
39 Mean tweets similarity The average pairwise tweets similarity based on the term frequency inverse document frequency.
40 Number of Hashtaged tweets The number of tweets that contain at least on hashtag in the user’s tweets.
41 Hashtags density The number of hashtags in the user’s tweets normalized by the number of the user’s tweets.
42 Tweets with links The number of tweets that contain at least one URL link.
43 Links density The number of URLs in the user’s tweets normalized by the number of the user’s tweets.
44 Average number of characters Total number of characters in the user’s tweets divided by the number of user’s tweets.
45 Min, Max, Avg, Median of
number of tweets posted per
day
Minimum, maximum, average, and median of the number of tweets that are posted daily by the user.
46 Min, Max, Avg, Median of
number of tweets posted per
week
Minimum, maximum, average, and median of the number of tweets that are posted per week by the
user.
47 Min, Max, Avg, Median of
the time tweets
Minimum, maximum, average, and median of the time difference between two consecutive tweets.
48 Tweets time distribution Distribution of the posting time of the user’s tweets over 24-hour period.
49 Variance in tweet intervals Variance in the posting time interval between each two consecutive tweets.
50 Active days Number of days between the oldest tweet and newest tweet in the user’s tweets.
51 API Ratio Ratio of the number of the user’s tweets posted by an API tool to the total number of the user’s
tweets
52 API URL Ratio Ratio of the number of the user’s tweets containing a URL posted by an API tool to the total number
of the user’s tweets posted by API.
53 API Tweet Similarity Content similarity of the tweets posted only by an API tool.
54 Country changes per month Number of times per month that a user moves across country boundaries between consecutive tweet.
55 Speed limit per month Monthly average number of times that the user has a traveling speed exceeding a defined speed
threshold.
56 Mean speed Average tweeting speed.
57 Max speed Maximum tweeting speed that the user followed in his tweets.
58 Unique countries per month Average monthly number of countries that the user has been in.
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cial spammer and legitimate user classes. In all of these sub-datasets, we have used the
same social spammer examples without duplicating legitimate user examples across
the sub-datasets.
Learning Algorithms. In experimenting the performance of our features and the
state-of-the-art ones, we use five supervised machine learning algorithms widely
adopted in building binary classification models for Twitter social spam detection.
These algorithms are: Naive Bayes, Random Forest with#Trees ∈ {100, 500, 1000},
J48 with Confidence Factor CF ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}, K-nearest neighbor with K ∈
{2, 5, 10}, and support vector machine (SVM) with radial basis function kernel (RBF)
and γ ∈ {0.5, 1.0}. We select these parameters since they have direct impact on pro-
ducing high performance classification models, with taking the over-fitting problem
into the consideration. We use Weka tool (Hall et al., 2009) as an implementation for
these algorithms.
Experiments Procedure. For each type of features (User, Content, and our Be-
havioral) and for a particular learning algorithm (Naive Bayes, Random Forest, J48,
K-NN, or SVM ), we perform the following steps: (i) we extract the selected type of
features from each sub-dataset, producing 35 (number of sub-datasets) feature spaces;
(ii) we apply 10-fold cross validation on each feature space using the learning algo-
rithm chosen, resulting 35 confusion matrices; (iii) finally, we compute the final per-
formance metrics for the chosen features type using the summation of the 35 confusion
matrices, avoiding the computation of the variance across the 35 sub-datasets.
5.2. Experimental Results
Baseline Results. The results of the three baselines are reported in Table 4. The
baseline "A" has accuracy of 50% because all social spammer examples have been
classified as legitimate users in sub-dataset of the 35 sub-datasets. Thus, in such a
case, the precision, recall, and F-measure of social spammer class are "0.0%" since no
account is classified as a social spammer at all. This baseline is easy to be bypassed
in all metrics when using supervised learning methods. For instance, the baseline "B"
of the 17 user features has performance of 69,4% of accuracy as a best result when
applying Random Forest learning method with #Trees = 1000, compared to the
other learning methods. We expect this behavior from Random Forest since it creates
various classification models through constructing a multitude of decision trees (e.g,
1,000). However, in terms of precision metric, SVM has better performance than other
learning methods. According to the low recalls and high precisions of social spammer
class, the SVM method has effectively modeled very small sets of social spammer
class examples, the rest of examples has been modeled as legitimate users. Moreover,
the average precision of SVM is lower than the precision of social spammer class
by about 24%. We interpret this behavior because our method followed in annotating
our data-set is not too precise from legitimate users class view (i.e., not all legitimate
users are truly legitimate users). The Naive Bayes learning method does not have an
acceptable performance, especially in recalling social spammers (35.6%). On the other
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Table 4. Performance results of the three baselines, our behavioral features, and the 
combination of user+content+behavioral features when applying the five mentioned 
machine learning algorithms in terms of different performance metrics
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure Avg. Precision Avg. Recall Avg. F-measure
Baseline (A): All Users Labeled as Legitimate Users
— 50,0% 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
Baseline (B): User Features
Naive Bayes 57,7 % 63,8 % 35,6 % 45,7 % 59,6 % 57,7 % 58,6 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 65,4 % 65,2 % 60,4 % 62,7 % 65,8 % 65,4 % 65,6 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 67,1 % 66,5 % 63,5 % 65,0 % 67,3 % 67,1 % 67,2 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 69,4 % 68,4 % 65,4 % 66,9 % 68,1 % 69,4 % 68,7 %
K-NN(K=2) 60,4 % 72,7 % 45,5 % 56,0 % 66,5 % 60,4 % 63,3 %
K-NN(K=5) 62,8 % 67,1 % 64,4 % 65,7 % 66,4 % 62,8 % 64,5 %
K-NN(K=10) 66,5 % 71,6 % 58,8 % 64,6 % 68,3 % 66,5 % 67,4 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 62,1 % 72,1 % 63,5 % 67,5 % 69,8 % 62,1 % 65,7 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 61,2 % 70,5 % 62,4 % 66,2 % 68,4 % 61,2 % 64,6 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 60,5 % 70,3 % 62,2 % 66,0 % 68,2 % 60,5 % 64,1 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 51,0 % 98,8 % 2,0 % 3,9 % 74,6 % 51,0 % 60,6 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 52,1 % 97,8 % 4,0 % 7,7 % 74,6 % 52,1 % 61,4 %
Baseline (C): Content Features
Naive Bayes 55,6 % 65,2 % 24,0 % 35,1 % 59,3 % 55,6 % 57,4 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 66,2 % 67,3 % 58,1 % 62,4 % 66,6 % 66,2 % 66,4 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 67,4 % 68,5 % 59,3 % 63,6 % 67,4 % 67,4 % 67,4 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 68,3 % 69,3 % 60,5 % 64,6 % 69,2 % 68,3 % 68,7 %
K-NN(K=2) 61,2 % 69,0 % 40,5 % 51,0 % 63,5 % 61,2 % 62,3 %
K-NN(K=5) 61,4 % 62,3 % 57,8 % 60,0 % 61,5 % 61,4 % 61,4 %
K-NN(K=10) 62,3 % 66,9 % 48,9 % 56,5 % 63,3 % 62,3 % 62,8 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 60,7 % 61,4 % 57,4 % 59,3 % 60,7 % 60,7 % 60,7 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 59,7 % 60,1 % 57,6 % 58,8 % 59,7 % 59,7 % 59,7 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 59,6 % 60,0 % 57,5 % 58,7 % 59,6 % 59,6 % 59,6 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 51,8 % 89,9 % 4,1 % 7,8 % 70,4 % 51,8 % 59,7 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 53,2 % 90,4 % 5,3 % 10,0 % 72,6 % 53,2 % 61,4 %
Behavioral (Our) Features
Naive Bayes 62 % 66,2 % 9,3 % 16,3 % 57,6 % 52,0 % 54,7 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 68,3 % 72,5 % 56,6 % 63,6 % 61,4 % 61,3 % 61,3 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 72,5 % 76,4 % 64,5 % 69,9 % 64,6 % 72,5 % 68,3 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 78,5 % 78,6 % 67,8 % 72,8 % 67,4 % 78,5 % 72,5 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 68,8 % 70,9 % 69,5 % 70,2 % 59,1 % 58,8 % 58,9 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 69,7 % 70,8 % 68,8 % 69,8 % 59,0 % 58,7 % 58,8 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 74,7 % 70,8 % 68,8 % 69,8 % 59,0 % 58,7 % 58,8 %
K-NN(K=2) 67,2 % 72,9 % 55,4 % 63,0 % 58,9 % 57,2 % 58,0 %
K-NN(K=5) 69,7 % 68 % 65,8 % 66,9 % 57,7 % 57,7 % 57,7 %
K-NN(K=10) 71,7 % 71,5 % 66,4 % 68,9 % 59,2 % 58,7 % 58,9 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 65,4 % 72,3 % 67,4 % 69,8 % 60,0 % 59,4 % 59,7 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 67,4 % 73,1 % 65,5 % 69,1 % 60,2 % 59,4 % 59,8 %
Baseline (B)+Baseline (C)+Behavioral (Our) Features
Naive Bayes 56,5 % 68,4 % 24,3 % 35,9 % 61,2 % 56,5 % 58,8 %
Random Forest (#Trees=100) 70,3 % 73,7 % 63,2 % 68,0 % 70,8 % 70,3 % 70,5 %
Random Forest (#Trees=500) 72,5 % 75,6 % 65,8 % 70,4 % 73,5 % 72,5 % 73,0 %
Random Forest (#Trees=1,000) 76,5 % 76,3 % 67,5 % 71,6 % 74,5 % 76,5 % 75,5 %
K-NN(K=2) 61,8 % 70,7 % 40,3 % 51,3 % 64,5 % 61,8 % 63,1 %
K-NN(K=5) 63,5 % 64,9 % 58,9 % 61,8 % 63,6 % 63,5 % 63,5 %
K-NN(K=10) 64,3 % 69,6 % 50,8 % 58,7 % 65,4 % 64,3 % 64,8 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,1 ) 63,9 % 64,2 % 62,9 % 63,5 % 63,9 % 63,9 % 63,9 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=0,5 ) 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 % 62,4 %
J48 (Confidence Factor=1,0 ) 62,3 % 62,3 % 62,4 % 62,3 % 62,3 % 62,3 % 62,3 %
SVM (Gamma=0,5) 50,3 % 99,3 % 0,6 % 1,2 % 74,7 % 50,3 % 60,1 %
SVM (Gamma=1,0) 52,4 % 97,5 % 1,4 % 2,8 % 76,4 % 52,4 % 62,2 %
side, the average recall value of Naive Bayes, 57.7% , shows that the method can recall
about 80% of legitimate users.
The results of the third baseline ,"C", when using 55 content features exploited
in the literature are worse than the user features in terms of all metrics. Although
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of the great number of content features, their performance shows that the content
features designed in the literature cannot effectively model the behavior of social
spammers. Also, in our case, the combination of weak features have not produced
a strong classification model. This behavior occurs probably because of possible cor-
relation among features. Similarly to the results of baseline "B", the Random Forest
with #Trees = 1000 is almost the best one in all metrics.
Behavioral Features Results. Our behavioral features, which are 10 features (one
byWriting Style Similarity, one by Language Model-Based Tweets Similarity, four by
Posting Behavior, and four by Posting Diversity), perform better than the three base-
lines ("A","B","C") in most performance metrics. As expected, Random Forest has a
classification accuracy more than 78%. As SVM has the highest social spammer class
precision and almost the lowest recall, using the F-measure metric is the right way to
compare with other baselines since this metric combines the precision and recall me-
trics. Thus, compared to the other baselines, the F-measure of our behavioral features
is higher than other two kinds of features by 5% ∼ 7%. Differently from baselines’
results, the performance of SVM when using our features is completely different at
the recall level. The use of RBF (Gaussian) kernel with γ of 0.5 gives an indication
that the distribution of our features for social spammer class might be correlated with
the Gaussian distribution and thus such a knowledge might help in building unsupervi-
sed advanced models like Gaussian mixture model. Finally, the results of our features
ensure our hypothesis about the need to focus on designing features that model the
behavior of social spammers.
All Features Results. To provide more insights into the performance of our fea-
tures, we report the results when using our features with the user and content features.
Unfortunately, we observe a slight degradation in the accuracy, recall and F-measure
of social spammer class, while we expect the opposite behavior exactly. In the machine
learning world, this phenomenon appears when the classification model over-fits the
input data. In other words, the increasing of the features dimension has separated well
the examples of both classes. However, separating well examples of different classes
is not always something perfect since the learning algorithms build a model for some
examples while those examples are truly noise.
False Positive v.s. High Quality. As our main problem has direct relation with the
information quality field, it is necessary to discuss the results from quality point of
view. As known in the spam email filtering, the efforts are directed towards the false
positive problem that occurs when a truly "non-spam" email is classified as "spam".
However, in the context of social spam, the false positive problem is less important
because of the availability of large-scale data collections, meaning that classifying
"non-spam" account as a "spam" one is not a serious and relevant problem to worry
about. Thus, the attention is turned in social networks context to increase the quality
of data where a wide range of Twitter based applications (e.g., tweets summarization)
has a high priority to work on noise-free collections. For choosing the appropriate mo-
del that can effectively filter out spam accounts, the recall of social spammer class is
the right metric that must be considered at models selection step. Thus, the J48 with
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confidence factor of 0.1 produces the best model which gives the highest recall when
leveraging our 10 behavioral features. F-measure of social spammer class comes after
the recall metric since it considers both recall and precision in the computation. In
the case of F-measure metric, the classification model that is produced by the Ran-
dom Forest learning method with #Trees = 1000 when adopting our 10 behavioral
features.
As the computational time aspect is significant when targeting large-scale col-
lections, the extraction of our features is completely suitable to process large-scale
collections with providing high quality collections. For instance, the time required to
process our Twitter data-set is no more than few hours, distributed between crawling
data from Twitter (Top 100 tweets) and features extraction, and predicting the class
label of each account using an already learned classification model. Although of our
features are suitable for handling large-scale collections, they are not suitable for real-
time detection because of the need for information from Twitter’s servers to process
each Twitter account (user).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have approached the problem of filtering out social spammers
existing in large-scale Twitter data collections. We have introduced a design of new
features which focus on modeling the social spammers’ behaviors, after analyzing
deeply a large set of spam accounts. The experimental results show that reducing the
social spam problem starts from understanding first the behavior of social spammers
in posting spam content. Thus, the simple design of our new 10 behavioral-based
features has performed better than 75 features introduced in the state-of-the-art. We
cannot conclude that our features have completely solved the social spam problem;
however, our features are able to detect the Twitter social spammers that have surly
and massive behavior in polluting Twitter content. As a future work, we intend to
apply unsupervised learning approach methods with designing more robust features.
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